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Abstract
The past decade witnessed great progress in research on health inequities. The most widely cited
definition of health inequity is, arguably, the one proposed by Whitehead and Dahlgren: "Health
inequalities that are avoidable, unnecessary, and unfair are unjust." We argue that this definition is
useful but in need of further clarification because it is not linked to broader theories of justice. We
propose an alternative, pluralist notion of fair distribution of health that is compatible with several
theories of distributive justice. Our proposed view consists of the weak principle of health equality
and the principle of fair trade-offs. The weak principle of health equality offers an alternative
definition of health equity to those proposed in the past. It maintains the all-encompassing nature
of the popular Whitehead/Dahlgren definition of health equity, and at the same time offers a richer
philosophical foundation. This principle states that every person or group should have equal health
except when: (a) health equality is only possible by making someone less healthy, or (b) there are
technological limitations on further health improvement. In short, health inequalities that are
amenable to positive human intervention are unfair. The principle of fair trade-offs states that weak
equality of health is morally objectionable if and only if: (c) further reduction of weak inequality
leads to unacceptable sacrifices of average or overall health of the population, or (d) further
reduction in weak health inequality would result in unacceptable sacrifices of other important
goods, such as education, employment, and social security.
Introduction
The past decade witnessed great progress in research on
health inequities. The standard use of terms is now firmly
established among health researchers and policy makers.
In the words of Kawachi, Subramanian, and Almeida-
Filho, "health inequality is the generic term used to desig-
nate differences, variations, and disparities in the health
achievements of individuals and groups," "while health
inequity refers to those inequalities in health that are
deemed to be unfair or stemming from some form of
injustice" [1]. Researchers and policy makers can now
choose their definition of health inequity from a wide
menu of views proposed by many scholars in the past dec-
ade [2-7]. Although desired results have not always been
achieved, many countries and international organizations
have for some time embraced a goal of redressing health
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The attempt to describe existing health inequities contin-
ues, and guidance on how to measure health inequities is
now available[9,10] along with novel measures of health
inequities [11,12].
Given the explosive growth of interest in health inequities
in the past decade, it is interesting that the most widely
cited definition of health inequity still is, arguably, the
one proposed by Whitehead and Dahlgren in 1991:
"Health inequalities that are avoidable, unnecessary and
unfair are unjust." [13]. The simplicity and all-encompass-
ing nature of this definition are certainly attractive, but it
is rudimentary in the light of recent developments in
health inequity research. The Whitehead/Dahlgren defini-
tion is useful, but not linked to broader theories of justice
[3]. For example, health inequalities that are "avoidable
or unnecessary" are, presumably, those we as a society
could do something about. But are all avoidable health
inequalities arising from, say, small differences in income
or educational level unjust? Should all non-health ine-
qualities be eliminated if they are associated with inequal-
ities in health? The definition is silent on such important
issues.
Moreover, the Whitehead/Dahlgren definition of health
equity requires an upgrade given the widespread agree-
ment on both reducing health inequities and increasing
overall population health [3,12,14-18]. While normative
political theorists disagree as to whether distributive (i.e.,
equity) and aggregative (i.e., overall) concerns should be
considered simultaneously or separately [19,20], policy
makers constantly face trade-offs between improving
equity in health and increasing the overall health of a
population in real life. For example, preventing cardiovas-
cular disease among inner city minorities may be more
difficult and costly than among people with higher
income and education. The same amount of effort and
resources may achieve higher risk reduction among the
well-off than the worse-off [3]. But is further improving
the health of the well-off,, thereby increasing inequality in
health between the well-off and the worst-off, the best
policy option? How much weight should policy makers
assign to the worst-off if this requires large sacrifices for
the better-off? To offer much needed guidance to policy
makers, health researchers need to combine distributive
and aggregative concerns in conceptualizing fairness
[21,22].
The rapidly developing literature on health inequity meas-
urement [11,12] is rarely linked to the Whitehead/Dahl-
gren definition, or indeed, to any definition of health
inequity. How we measure health inequities should
reflect our view on how we conceptualize health inequi-
ties [10]. To put it differently, our view on health inequity
should be clear and expansive enough to offer a founda-
tion on which various measures of health inequity can be
developed, explained, and used.
The aim of this paper is to propose a pluralist framework
of fair health distribution that addresses shortcomings in
the definitions of health inequity proposed in the past.
Our framework consists of two principles: the weak prin-
ciple of health equality and the principle of fair trade-offs.
The weak principle of health equality offers an alternative
definition of health inequity. In developing this principle,
it is not our intention to review the immensely rich litera-
ture on health equity; rather, we defend an alternative
view of health equity that is grounded in general theories
of justice. The principle of fair trade-offs supplements
weak equality in health, and when integrated the two
principles represent a comprehensive and more practical
understanding of health inequity - what we prefer to call
fair health distribution. Trade-off questions require bal-
ancing health equity and overall population health as well
as balancing concern for health with concern for other
goods.
Equality of what?
Reasoning about distributive justice in health needs to be
based on a general and reasonable unit of distribution.
The term 'health' needs specification. Following Rawls,
Nagel, Sen, Parfit and Daniels, we argue that theories of
fair distribution should be concerned with individual
people's life prospects [15,23-26]. In the context of health,
a person's overall lifetime prospect in terms of longevity
and health-related quality of life is therefore a reasonable
choice. Following Gakidou, Murray and Frenk, we could
define the unit of distribution as health-adjusted life
expectancy (HALE) [4,27]. Another alternative would be
to use a similar measure of lifetime health (without
adopting the ex-ante perspective) that includes both a time
dimension, measured as life years, and a quality of life
dimension, understood in terms of morbidity, pain and
functioning. Fortunately, such measures of health-
adjusted life years (HALYs) exist, although none of them
are perfect, for example, quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs) and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs)
[28,29].
Whatever measure is chosen, it can be linked to more gen-
eral theories of fair distribution of advantage, such as gen-
eral economic welfare theory, a Rawlsian theory of justice,
or Sen's capability approach. Broome has argued that
health is important insofar as it contributes to overall
well-being [30]. Daniels has argued that health is impor-
tant in that it contributes to fair equality of opportunity
(whether it is linked to Rawls' theory or more general
political conceptions of equal opportunity) [25]. Sen has
argued that it would be natural to see health, in his view,Page 2 of 9
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ments in the set of 'capabilities' that egalitarians should be
concerned about [15,31].
Daniels' extended notion of equal opportunity is closer to
Sen's notion of capability - understood as freedom to pur-
sue his or her objectives - than Rawls' original fair equality
of opportunity principle (the original principle was meant
to secure access to positional goods such as offices and
positions only) [3]. It is also interesting to note that if
health is seen as an element of people's freedom "to pro-
mote or achieve valuable functionings", health has more
in common with positive freedom than with resources or
utility. In a pluralist framework, equal distribution of
freedoms may be assigned a greater weight than aggrega-
tive concerns. Freedom is a good everyone has reason to
want insofar as it does not interfere with other people's
freedom. This means that how we understand health will
also influence our views on how to balance competing
concerns.
Without taking a stand on which theory is most appropri-
ate, there is room to link health either to a theory of well-
being, to a theory of primary goods, or to the capability
approach. We suggest that it is acceptable to see health
(measured in its most general form as healthy life expect-
ancy) as one intrinsic element in any general conception
of advantage linked to a general theory of justice.
A defence of the weak principle of health 
equality
We distinguish between strong and weak equality. The
most straightforward view of health equity is strong
health equality, where every person or group has equal
health. In the normative literature on inequalities in
health, however, there is almost unanimous agreement
that strong equality of health is an unattainable and unat-
tractive goal and should therefore be avoided or modified.
For example, in a recent summary of the normative litera-
ture on this issue, Asada concludes that:
"Strict equality for all, however, is not an attractive
view for various reasons. For example, it denies per-
sonal choice. It would be unrealistically expensive.
Moreover, it would be unachievable because some
determinants of health are beyond human control.
Unlike political liberty, strict equality in health for all
would not be a feasible nor agreeable goal." [32]
Brock expresses a similar view in somewhat different
words:
" [...] some commitment to equality is a central feature
of nearly all theory of justice, with most of the dispute
being in what respects should people be equal. How-
ever, whatever the relevant arguments, strong objec-
tions exist to a fundamental commitment to equality in
outcomes or conditions, both in general and as the
basis for a special concern for the worst off." [33]
(emphasis added).
Rejecting strong equality of health, the question then
becomes when we can reasonably diverge from strong
health equality. Below, we will examine four widely held
objections to strong equality of health: (1) the levelling
down objection, (2) only those inequalities that are social
are unjust, (3) individual responsibility, and (4) the prob-
lem of biological or technological limitations. On the
basis of the examination of these four objections, we
defend the weak principle of health equality as a back-
bone of our proposed framework of fair health distribu-
tion.
Levelling down objection
Health economists, Culyer and Wagstaff, in a widely cited
article, define an equitable distribution of health care as
"simply one which gives rise to an equal distribution of
health." They immediately add the following qualifica-
tion: "Of course, this will almost certainly have to be qual-
ified by a side condition that greater equality cannot be
achieved by reducing the health of some as a deliberate act
of policy" [34]. This qualification is a response to a com-
mon objection to strong equality, the levelling down
objection. Parfit has argued that egalitarians should not
be concerned about strong equality, but rather be con-
cerned with giving priority to the worst off [24]. No one
would argue that we should "blind the sighted to equalize
health states with the blind".
Daniels defines the goal of "equity in health" partly in
response to the levelling down objection:
"One natural way to understand the goal of equity in
health--the goal of health egalitarians--is to say that we
should aim, ultimately, to make all people healthy;
that is, to help them to function normally over a nor-
mal lifespan. Pursuing equality means "levelling up"--
bringing all those in less than full health to the status
of the healthy."[35]
We accept the argument that levelling down is never a
good thing, but we hold that equality often is. As we dem-
onstrate in the last section, when weak equality and trade-
off considerations are combined properly in a pluralist
theory of fair distribution, egalitarians can still promote
the value of equality. This argument is grounded on a plu-
ralist moral view [31]. Levelling down will never be
judged as a good thing for egalitarians if we adopt a plu-
ralist theory that integrates distributional concerns with
overall goodness [22]. Equality is not the only value egal-Page 3 of 9
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should not reject it.
Only those inequalities that are social are unjust
Arguably, the strongest objection historically to defining
health equity as strong equality in health has been that
health is a natural good and cannot be redistributed by
institutions (such as the health care system or more
broadly, a welfare system) in the same way as income.
Many scholars think the distinction between naturally
and socially created inequalities is of moral importance.
Fairness or justice is concerned only about socially created
inequalities, not naturally created inequalities.
This distinction goes back to Rawls, who, more than 35
years ago, distinguished social goods from natural goods
and suggested that health should be considered as a natu-
ral good [23]. Health cannot be distributed in the same
way as political rights or income. Although Rawls' ideal
theory did not discuss the distribution of health and
health care at all (Rawls famously assumed disease and
disability away and stipulated that the parties in the orig-
inal position are fully cooperating members of society
over a complete life), the view of health as a natural good
has survived up to this day. From these two assumptions
combined (that health is a natural good, and that the par-
ties in the original positions have normal capabilities of
their complete lifespan), it follows, for instance, that a
severe mental disability is not a concern for justice
[Attempts at extending or modifying these assumptions in
Rawls can be found in Daniels (1985/2007) and
Pogge(1989). Daniels does not build upon Rawls' original
assumptions].
Does this distinction between social and natural goods
indeed hold, and is it morally relevant and useful? We
shall not attempt to review the very interesting debate
about the correct interpretation of Rawls' view on this issue,
but rather question the factual premise this debate presup-
poses [36]. In our view, this distinction is irrelevant in
thinking about when inequalities in health are unjust.
First, health is primarily a social good. In the world we live
in today, the basic institutions of society determine to a
large extent the level and distribution of health. According
to statistics from the World Mortality Report, life expect-
ancy in many countries has increased by as much as ten
years since the early 1970s [37]. This change is mediated
through social factors such as economic growth, technol-
ogy, reduced inequalities, knowledge and investment in
public health and health systems. The WHO reports that
life expectancy at birth ranges from 77 (for males) and 82
(for females) in Norway to 41 (for both males and
females) in Malawi [38]. Natural factors probably play a
minor role in explaining this difference. The health of
peoples, or nations, is not something given but funda-
mentally shaped by how societies are organized and how
the benefits of cooperation are shared. We know that
Malawi is a much poorer country than Norway, and that
the social determinants of health (including health care
and public health) are unequally distributed between and
within the two countries. The literature on the social
determinants of health has, convincingly in our view,
demonstrated that social factors are dominantly associ-
ated with inequalities in health [39,40]. Health is, then, a
concern for social justice.
Second, in most cases it is not possible to distinguish
between natural and social causes of disease. Diseases,
such as cardiovascular disease or cancer, typically result
from the complex interaction between genetic and envi-
ronmental factors (widely understood to include many of
the social determinants of health) [41,42]. A person may
inherit genes that increase the risk for, say, cardiovascular
disease, but this risk is substantially modified by personal
behaviour, the environment and culture, and the basic
institutional structures in which that person grows up.
Singling out one etiological factor as natural and others as
social is in practice difficult, if not impossible.
Third, natural and genetic inequalities in health are actu-
ally taken seriously in health policy and clinical practice.
Convincing arguments are needed to depart from this
view. For example, women who have inherited the BRA1
gene that increases their lifetime risk for breast and ovar-
ian cancer by up to 70-80% are typically treated with more
concern than others, not less. Indeed, why should geneti-
cally inherited disease (caused by the natural lottery) be
given less or no priority compared to those who acquire a
disease because they live in poverty or lack basic educa-
tion? Whether risk is associated with unfair social circum-
stances or is the result of the natural lottery, it affects well-
being, opportunities and freedom to the same degree. Dis-
ease and risk of disease are not in the same category as the
colour of our eyes or beauty in our judgment of social
obligations. In clinical practice, no one would consider
whether a condition is caused by social or natural factors
as a decisive reason for different prioritisation. Practice
does not make a thing right, but if we consider principles
against well-considered intuitions in reflective equilib-
rium, this widely held intuition should be considered seri-
ously [43].
Finally, the implications of the distinction between natu-
ral and social factors are counterintuitive and not norma-
tively attractive. Some people have low life expectancy
because they are poor, lack education and employment.
Others may have low life expectancy, even if not so poor,
because they happen to be in a natural setting where there
are a lot of malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Should this "nat-Page 4 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:40 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/40ural fact" be a factor against a justice concern? "Freedom
from malaria" is one of Sen's paradigmatic examples of
what an egalitarian theory should focus on [44]. We agree.
If anyone thinks that freedom from malaria should not be
a concern for justice, it is probably a mistaken expression
of the underlying intuitions that there are some health
inequalities we cannot, as a society, do anything about.
Consider the situation in the early 1980s before the exist-
ence of HIV was known, before its ways of transmission
was known and before antiretroviral treatment was devel-
oped. The fact that some people died prematurely from
AIDS at that time could not be considered unfair, because
the disease was not possible to prevent or treat.1 Being free
from malaria (and HIV today), on the other hand, is a
concern for justice because society does have the knowl-
edge and the means to prevent and treat them. In our
view, the relevant distinction is whether the institutions of
society can respond adequately to a disease or not, which
we will elaborate below - not whether the causes are nat-
ural or social.
The upshot of this discussion is that most health inequal-
ities should - as a starting point - be considered unjust.
The division between health as a natural and a social good
is not possible to define. Neither is it morally relevant. [Of
course it would be judged unfair if they had been denied
access to preventive measures. That many people died pre-
maturely was also a reason to fund HIV research.]
Individuals should have some responsibility for inequality
Another widely held objection to strong health equality is
personal responsibility. Temkin, though his work does
not focus specifically on health, proposes the following
view of which inequalities are of moral concern: "Egalitar-
ians generally believe that it is bad for some to be worse
off than others through no fault or choice of their own"
[19]. Sen also argues that the issue of personal responsi-
bility has some bearing on the issue of health inequalities:
"What is particularly serious as an injustice is the lack
of opportunity that some may have to achieve good
health because of inadequate social arrangements, as
opposed to, say, a personal decision not to worry
about health in particular. In this sense, an illness that
is unprevented and untreated for social reasons
(because of, say, poverty or the overwhelming force of
a community-based epidemic), rather than out of per-
sonal choice (such as smoking or other risky behavior
by adults), has a particularly negative relevance to
social justice." [15]
Similarly, liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice
argue that a central goal of public policy should be to
secure all individuals equal opportunities. All equal
opportunity approaches argue that society should elimi-
nate inequalities that arise from factors beyond individual
control. One prominent position argues that equal oppor-
tunity requires that all inequalities that arise from factors
outside the agent's control in the social and the natural
lottery, such as a person's natural and genetic abilities
should be eliminated, but that inequalities or costs that
arise from factors under the agent's control should be
accepted [45].
Applied to the context of health the principle of equality
implies that all individuals who make the same choices
should be treated as if they were identical with respect to
all factors outside their own control. This view holds that
natural inequalities (associated with, for example, genetic
factors) should be a concern for egalitarian justice.
A common misunderstanding of liberal egalitarianism is
that these theories argue that individuals should be held
responsible for the consequences of their choice. In the con-
text of health this would imply that all inequalities in
health are counted as fair if the agent in question could
have avoided bad health outcomes by making different
choices. However, the principle of responsibility states
that individuals should be held responsible for their
choices, not for the consequences of their choices [46,47].
It is only in the special case where the outcome only
depends on the individual's choices and not on any other
factors (including the responsibility of society) that this
principle implies that individuals should be held respon-
sible for the consequences of their actions. To hold people
responsible for the actual consequences of their choice
would therefore be to hold them responsible for too
much [48]. The implication of the principle of responsi-
bility on the concept of health equality is therefore in
practice limited.
Interestingly, health systems of liberal societies generally
embody this (correctly understood) principle of responsi-
bility. We discourage people from practising "irresponsi-
ble" health behaviours, such as smoking, unsafe sex, and
sedentary life styles, through public health and health
promotion. For some behaviours, we make people
responsible for their action by imposing taxes (e.g., tax on
cigarettes) or making them illegal (e.g., seat belt laws). But
our health systems do not treat the reckless and the sensi-
ble differently.
Strong equality is unachievable because of limitations of 
biology and technology
The final objection to strong health equality commonly
found in the literature relates to considerations about bio-
logical and technological limitations. Many definitions of
health inequity proposed by health science researchers
suggest that inequalities in health are fair if those inequal-
ities are unavoidable. Whitehead and Dahlgren explicitlyPage 5 of 9
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the pragmatic definition of health equity adopted by the
International Society for Equity in Health in 2000 focuses
on remediability: "Equity in health is the absence of sys-
tematic and potentially remediable differences in one or
more aspects of health across socially, demographically,
or geographically defined populations or population sub-
groups" [49]. Furthermore, though not as explicit as the
two definitions above, Gakidou, Murray, and Frenk, in
their proposal for measuring health inequities across
countries for The World Health Report 2000, consider
health inequalities caused by factors amenable to human
interventions as unjust [4,27].
The concern for unavoidability in the health equity litera-
ture echoes the idea of shortfall equality developed by Sen
and Anand for the human development index [50]. They
are concerned about the fact that some people are more
efficient converters of resources or goods to well-being (or
health) than others [51]. Anand and Sen explain:
"In those cases in which human diversity is so power-
ful that it is impossible to equalize the maximal levels
that are potentially achievable, there is a basic ambigu-
ity in assessing achievement, and in judging equality
of achievement (or of the freedom to achieve). If the
maximal achievement of person 1 -- under the most
favourable circumstances -- is, say, x, and that for per-
son 2 is 2x, then equality of attainment would invari-
ably leave person 2 below her potential achievement."
[50]
As an alternative to strong or attainment equality, Anand
and Sen defend shortfall equality (for a more extended
discussion and some reservations, see [16]). This view can
most easily be illustrated by reference to gender inequal-
ity: There is a commonly observed gender difference in life
expectancy of about 2-5 years (researchers disagree about
the correct figure), favouring women [52]. In a society
where life expectancy is, for example, 60 years for men
and women, this equality in life expectancy by sex would
be judged equitable if strong equality is the normative
standard, while it is inequitable if shortfall equality is the
standard.
The key question is: if strong equality is not feasible,
should egalitarians be concerned about strong equality or
equal shortfall from what is feasible? In short, should we
be concerned about all health inequalities (measured
from an equal baseline), or only shortfall inequalities
(measured from a baseline defined by what is possible)?
We agree with Anand and Sen, that equity concerns ine-
qualities that are avoidable. Although they do not clearly
define when we should consider inequalities to be una-
voidable, the term often includes limitations of biology,
technology or knowledge. Anand and Sen refer to limita-
tions of biology when they defend shortfall equality in the
case of men and women as illustrated above. Our view of
biological limitations is that, whether they are functional
or mental limitations, egalitarians should not count them
as legitimate shortfalls. Above, we argued against the view
that only those inequalities that are social are unjust. In
health policy and clinical practice, we take natural ine-
qualities in health seriously and consider them as impor-
tant as social inequalities in health. Inequalities due to
biology are examples of natural inequalities, and we do
not see why gender deserves special consideration among
many other biological factors, such as genetics.
It appears reasonable, on the other hand, that egalitarians
should be concerned about limitations caused by the level
of technology or knowledge available. The implications of
this departure from strong equality are probably substan-
tial as technological limitations change over time. To
repeat our example from above, using shortfall equality as
the standard, people dying prematurely from HIV/AIDS in
the early 1980s (before the aetiology of the disease was
known) were suffering tremendously, but their tragically
reduced life expectancy was not unfair. Given the medical
advancement for HIV/AIDS treatment in recent decades,
however, the same amount of suffering and premature
death now is quite rightly considered inequitable.
We believe the idea of shortfall equality applied to tech-
nological limitations reflects a sound principle and well-
considered moral intuitions that many people hold
regarding equity -although what such limitations entail
requires further clarification.
Statement of the weak principle of health equality
The discussion above on four objections to strong health
inequality suggests the following. First, health equity
should not be improved by "levelling down," that is, mak-
ing people less healthy. The objection loses force if con-
cern for equality is integrated with concern for average
health as required by a pluralist theory of fair distribution.
Second, when considering which health inequalities are
unjust, distinguishing social and natural factors is morally
irrelevant. Third, health inequalities are acceptable if they
are derived completely from choices that free and fully
informed adults make. But such health inequalities are
extremely rare, and in practice, individuals cannot often
be held responsible for health inequalities due to choice.
Finally, health inequalities are fair if they are associated
with technological limitations on further health improve-
ments.
Taken together, we propose a definition of weak health
inequality: every person or group should have equalPage 6 of 9
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making someone less healthy, or (b) technological limita-
tions exist to further health improvements. In other
words, the weak principle of health equality suggests that
health inequalities that are amenable to positive human
interventions are unacceptable.
Trade-off questions
All definitions of health equity proposed in the past have
exclusively focused on health inequalities: among many
health inequalities, which ones are unfair? The weak prin-
ciple of health equality is one partial answer to this ques-
tion. A definition of fair distribution of health needs to
expand its scope beyond health inequalities. Even if the
weak principle of health equality is satisfied - every person
or group has equal health adjusted for technological lim-
itations to further health improvements - there may be sit-
uations where fairness in distribution rejects weak health
inequality.
Achieving health equality is an important goal but is only
the first step towards a broader pluralist notion of fair
health distribution. The next step involves trade-offs with
other objectives. In the world of limited resources, defined
broadly in terms of, for example, money, time, and tal-
ents, to tackle serious issues in our society, how important
is it for us to commit to the weak principle of health
equality? We divide such trade-off issues into two catego-
ries, trade-off between weak health equality and overall
health, and trade-off between health and other goods.
Together we call them trade-off questions, which form
another backbone of our proposed framework of fair
health distribution.
Trade-off between weak equality and average
Weak equality of health is morally objectionable when
further improvement in weak equality leads to unaccepta-
ble sacrifices of average or overall health of the popula-
tion. This formulation, of course, leaves open the
normative question about which trade-offs between weak
equality and average health are unacceptable. It is crucial
to note, however, that a framework of fair distribution
should acknowledge that weak equality is not the only
concern. As noted by Sen, equality is not only a complex
notion where there is "internal plurality" within the con-
cept itself. Equality can only be properly understood if it
is considered together with other key ethical concepts:
"The demands of equality cannot be clearly inter-
preted or understood without taking adequate note of
efficiency considerations. The point is not merely that
the demands of equality have to be ultimately
weighted against the force of competing demands,
when present. It is also that the interpretation of the
demands that equality makes has to be assessed in the
light of other considerations (e.g. aggregative con-
cerns) that are inter alia recognized. The explicit admit-
tance of other concerns avoids the overburdening of
equality with unnecessary loads." [16]
Trade-off questions are important in the context of popu-
lation-level policies, where the aim is to distribute healthy
life years fairly. For example, how much equality of
healthy life years between different groups or individuals
is a decision-maker is willing to sacrifice, in order to move
towards a higher average for all? Or, following Anand:
'what amount of healthy life years, if enjoyed equally by
everybody, would have equivalent value to a greater aver-
age healthy life expectancy?' [14,53]. Equal health here
refers to equality in health that is amenable to positive
human intervention.
As yet there is no full-fledged principled account of how
balancing of this kind can be handled. But economists
have suggested a number of indices that attempt to cap-
ture the trade-off between weak equal health (or "equity"
as the economists call it) and maximizing concerns (effi-
ciency), including the modified Atkinson's index sug-
gested by Anand [14,53], and the Achievement index
proposed by Wagstaff [12], which incorporates concerns,
such as (a) aversion to weak inequality of health, (b) a
special concern for the worst off individuals or groups,
and (c) explicit judgment about the appropriate trade-off
between egalitarian concerns (a + b) and maximization
concerns [21]. Further investigation is needed to see
whether our concerns about fair distributions can be
quantified appropriately by these indices. Reasonable
quantitative measures coupled with fair processes for
making normative choices explicit and legitimate could
be used to bridge health policy and the unified framework
that we are proposing [54].
Trade-offs between health and other goods
Weak health equality may also be unfair if further reduc-
tion in health inequality would unacceptably increase ine-
quality or reduce aggregate well-being in other domains of
concern (such as education, employment, social security,
and so on). In other words, some departures from weak
equality in health are acceptable with reference to other
important social objectives. For example, in a welfare state
with publicly financed health care, one may justify limits
on the provision of high-cost last-chance chemotherapy
with marginal health benefits with reference to improve-
ments in social security for the homeless or in primary
education. Although many think that health is special,
rightly so in our view, health is partly also a tradeable
good [55,56].
Health cannot be seen in isolation from other goods, and
the interrelation between health and other advantages isPage 7 of 9
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in health may be acceptable if we could thereby reduce
inequality in other domains more. On the other hand,
and this is most often the case, if inequalities in the other
domains also increase inequality in health, this may be
considered "doubly" unfair. We need a robust theory
which integrates health and other substantive goods.
Some existing philosophical theories are a good start, as
we briefly sketch here. For example, Daniels argues that
Rawls' theory of justice provides a unified account of jus-
tice that can help explain when social group inequalities
in health are unfair: "Health inequalities are unjust or
unfair if they result from an unjust distribution of the
socially controllable factors that affect health". He sug-
gests that what counts as "an unjust distribution of the
socially controllable factors" might follow from Rawls'
theory. One problem, however, is that this theoretical
framework lacks an index of primary goods that can be
used for making trade-offs between health and non-
health primary goods.
The Rawlsian framework provides little guidance, Prah
Ruger has argued, "when accounts of social and economic
justice conflict with accounts of justice with respect to
health" [57]. As she points out:
" [B]efore giving substantially greater weight to
broader socioeconomic policies than to health poli-
cies, we need to understand the precise mechanisms
through which various factors influence health. We
must then determine how to weight different social
objectives, once we have this information. In light of
existing information on social determinants of health,
it would be unwise to prescribe sweeping policies,
such as completely flattening of socioeconomic ine-
qualities, in an effort to improve health."[57]
Sen's capability approach provides an alternative frame-
work for evaluating justice. Sen lists five categories of
rights and opportunities that are seen as necessary to help
"advance the general capability of a person" [44]. Poverty
is defined as capability deprivation in any of these catego-
ries. Sen's list includes: political freedoms; economic facil-
ities; social opportunities; transparency guaranties; and
protective securities. Health would probably be subsumed
under social opportunities, although transparency guar-
antees and protective guaranties also include relevant
aspects of health-related agency and having good health
[58]. This framework links health to a general theory of
justice in a way that is interesting. Prah Ruger argues that
Sen's approach is superior to Rawlsian analysis in this
respect [57]. The capability approach, however, requires
that we develop a comparable metric of advantage across
various domains [31,59,60].
Concluding remarks
When are inequalities in health unfair? Answers to this
question may be useful for people who want to measure
inequalities in health. A definition of health equity may
also be useful to people who are concerned about priority
setting in health and health care.
Our framework of fair health distribution is composed of
the weak principle of health equality and the principle of
fair trade-offs. The weak principle of health equality offers
an alternative definition of health equity to those pro-
posed in the past. The weak principle of health equality
maintains the core ideas of the widely popular White-
head/Dahlgren definition of health equity, and at the
same time, it offers a richer philosophical foundation.
This principle states that every person or group should
have equal health except when: (a) such strong health
equality is only possible by making someone less healthy,
or (b) technological limitations exist to further health
improvements. In short, health inequalities that are ame-
nable to positive human interventions are unacceptable.
The principle of fair trade-offs supplements the weak prin-
ciple of health equality. The principle of fair trade-offs
states that weak equality of health is morally objectiona-
ble if and only if: (c) further reductions in weak health
inequality leads to unacceptable sacrifices of average or
overall health of the population; or (d) further reduction
in weak health inequality would result in unacceptable
sacrifices of other important goods, such as education,
employment, and social security. We believe coupling the
weak principle of health equality with the principle of fair
trade-offs will offer a fuller view of health equity than the
traditional view. A combined pluralist framework is nec-
essary to understand fair health distribution.
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